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WILL A CONSTITUTION FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Speaking Notes of Elizabeth Shaver Duquettef
March 27, 2003
Loyola University Chicago School of Law

Introduction
A process is underway to create a constitution for the European Union
("EU"). How this document evolves, and what effect it may have on the EU, is
as yet unsettled. A constitution for the EU could mean many things; indeed, the
possible impacts can be viewed on a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, a real
constitution could form the basis for a future federal European state. The idea of
a "United States of Europe," a term coined by Winston Churchill after World
War II, would mean a true political union. While the EU has achieved an
economic union via the common market and a monetary union via the euro, it
has yet to target political union as a goal. At the other end of the spectrum, with
far less ambitious goals, is an EU constitution that merely provides a vehicle to
give the EU more legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and the world. This sort of
constitution would not affect the sovereignty of the member states, but could
make improvements to the existing structure of the EU.
The opposing ends of the spectrum largely center on a political debatewhether to have a federal Europe. Within the parameters of this debate, however,
one must also address the equally important legal and institutional issues, such as
how the EU can run more efficiently and democratically. No matter where one
falls on the spectrum of debate, the common goal is some amount of increased
integration for Europe. The degree of increased integration will become apparent
only when the member states ratify the new constitution.
The Existing Treaties
The EU is a product of numerous treaties. The most important treaties for our
1
discussions today are the Treaty Establishing the European Community, most
f Elizabeth Shaver Duquette is an adjunct professor of European Union law at DePaul University
College of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, and the University of Chicago Law
School. She taught for three years at Pepperdine University School of Law in London and
practiced private law in Chicago, Frankfurt, and London. Ms. Duquette holds an LL.M. from the
London School of Economics and Political Science, a J.D. from the University of Southern
California Law Center, and an A.B. from Stanford University.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2002 O.J (C 325)
33,

available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EC-consol.pdf.
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Constitution for the European Union
recently amended by the Treaty of Nice,2 and the Treaty on European Union.3
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has said many times that the EU treaties
are more than just mere international agreements. The treaties create
institutions-like the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, and
the ECJ-that have definitive legislative and executive powers. These powers
can dramatically affect member state sovereignty. Because the treaties have this
constitution-like function, the ECJ has characterized the treaties as a
"constitutional charter" and a "new legal order.",4 The full effect of this "new
legal order" can be seen through the application of the7 doctrines of supremacy,5
direct effect, 6 and the preliminary reference procedure.
Although the treaties are exceptional in many ways, they fall short of forming
a constitutional state. A "new legal order" suggests that the treaties have created
something that is separate from the member states. In reality, however, this legal
order is dependent on the cooperation and blessing of the member states'
governments. In effect, the EU derives its authority from the member states, not
just from the treaties in the way that traditional states derive their authority from
a constitution alone. Thus, the EU is clearly not an independent actor. Perhaps
the major stumbling block is evidenced by the reality that the EU must rely on
the member states to implement and enforce European Community ("EC") law.
The ECJ may declare that a member state has violated EC law, but it has no real
enforcement mechanism independent from the cooperation of the member states.
Does Europe Need Further Integration?
It has been suggested that the primary reason for a European constitution is to
achieve further integration of Europe. Why is further integration desirable? First,
given the current crisis in Iraq, many Europeans and non-Europeans believe that
the EU should have the ability to respond with one voice to global issues. The
broader hope is for a coordinated, uniform foreign policy, which the EU has
largely lacked in its response to the American and United Nations' positions on
Iraq.
A second justification for further integration addresses issues that will arise
Treaty].
2

Treaty of Nice, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/treaties/dat/

nicetreaty-en.pdf
3 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2002 0. J. (C 325) 5, available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU-consol.pdf [hereinafter E.U. Treaty].
4 Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en
Loos v.
Netherelands Inland Revenue Administration, [1963] E.C.R. 1, See also Case 294/83, Les Verts v.
European Parliament, [19861 E.C.R. 1339.
5 Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L, [1964] E.C.R. 585 available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/.
6 Van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.R. 1 available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/.

7 E.C Treaty, art. 234.
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from the EU's imminent enlargement. Accusations of institutional inefficiency
are likely to multiply once the EU incorporates the applicant member states.
Finally, further integration could magnify the perceived and real lack of the
EU's democratic accountability. The democratic deficit of the EU has been a
constant criticism since its inception, and the problem is likely to worsen as the
EU expands. An EU constitution could assign more power to the European
Parliament, increase the involvement of national parliaments and institute
Europe-wide elections to choose key EU officials.8 However, one must ask, from
a practical perspective, whether it is realistic for the EU to be run democratically,
especially after the number of member states grows to twenty-five or thirty.
Timing and Structure of the EU's Proposed Constitution
The European Convention on the Future of Europe ("Convention") is in the
process of drafting the EU's constitution. The goal is to produce a working
document as early as June 2003, with the hope that it may be adopted by
December 2003. 9 This deadline is extremely ambitious, if not totally unrealistic,
given the absence of many provisions-even in draft form-and the timing of
the ongoing enlargement process. Before a new member can join the EU, the
applicant member state, as well as all the current member states, must ratify the
existing treaties according to their national constitutional traditions. Even if the
Convention produced a final constitution before year-end, it is unlikely that the
existing treaties could be ratified to include the applicant member states before
then.
In structure, the draft constitution has three parts. Part One addresses the
constitutional structure of the Union.' 0 Part Two covers the EU's implementation
of its substantive policies, including internal and external action, defense, and

See Stefanie Schmid-Lfibbert & Hans-Bemd Schaefer, The Constitution of the European
Union, 2002 German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Paper 3, available at
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/.
9 Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty, presented at Plenary session, October 28, 2002,
CONV 369/02, available at http://www.eel.nl/treatie/00369en2.pdf, [hereinafter Preliminary
Draft]; See also Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, adopted by the European
Convention, June 13 & July 10, 2003, 2003 (C 169) 1, [hereinafter Adopted Constitution Treaty].
Editor's Note: At the time of this speech, the draft treaty was going through constant change and
development. A preliminary draft of the constitution was presented in October 2002, and its
purpose was to illustrate the possible articulation of a treaty. From February to June 2003, the
drafting process of the articles took place, including the preliminary drafts of articles 1-16, and 2433. Finally, in July 2003, the Convention presented the most recent version of the draft treaty. The
July 2003 draft contains some notable additions when compared to the outline of the October 2002
draft. However, there were no major changes to the structure or content of the constitution itself. In
regards to this presentation, none of the points given were affected by the new draft treaty.
Accordingly, where both are applicable, citations will include the corresponding articles in both
the October 2002 and July 2003 drafts.
10Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, pt. 1; Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra note 9, pt. 1. Both
8

versions set forth the same objective of constitutional structure and implementation.
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functioning of the EU." 1 Part Three contains general and final provisions. The
constitution is being created through a debate process, much of which occurs
online and is accessible to people through the EU's website.12 This format is
designed to increase democratic participation and transparency.
The Convention is composed of representatives from the parliament and
government of each member state, sixteen members of the European Parliament,
and two representatives of the European Commission. Representatives from the
government and parliament of each applicant member state are also taking part
in the proceedings, but they do not have veto power, as dictated by the Laeken
Declaration. 1"

Highlights of the Constitutional Proposal as of January 2003
Creation of a Single Treaty
The first goal of the new constitution is to scrap the existing pillar structure of
the EU, which is considered unnecessarily confusing, and replace it with a single
treaty that is definitively constitutional in form. The single surviving entity will
be the EU, which will have a newfound legal status and personality. Currently,
the EU has no legal personality-meaning that it cannot enter into agreementswhich negatively impacts its global image. Additionally, the doctrine of
supremacy will become a constitutional dictate. Currently, EU law enjoys
supremacy over national law only through judge-made law. 14
Simplification of Legal Instruments
The new constitution also proposes to reduce the complexity and number of
legal instruments in EU law. An established hierarchy will replace the
interpretive hierarchy now attributed to various legal instruments. At the top of
the hierarchy will be "European law," which will consist of all legislative acts
with general application. European law will be directly applicable in member
states. One notch down will be "European framework laws," which are
legislative acts without direct applicability. Rather, they will function much like
current EU directives. "European regulations" come next, which are nonlegislative acts having direct applicability and general application. "European
decisions" are the next to last hierarchically important legal instruments and are

1 Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, pt 2; Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra note 9, pt. 3. The
July 2003 draft moves discussion of policy implementation to Part 3, and adds the following to
Part 2: "the charter of Fundamental rights of the union."
12 See generally http://www.europa.eu.int.
13 See Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union at "See Laeken Declaration
on
the Future of the European Union at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/docl5l20l
_en.htm
14 Costa, 1964 E.C.R. supra note 5, at 594.
International Law Review

Volume I, Issue I

Constitution for the European Union
non-legislative acts binding in their entirety only on those to whom they are
addressed. Finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy are recommendations and
opinions, which are not binding.
Individual Rights Established
The EU constitution also proposes to establish human rights as an area of law,
which will be a step up from its current status as a general principle of law. The
draft constitution states that the EU is founded on human dignity, liberty and
democratic values' 5 and addresses and develops the concept of fundamental
human rights.' 6 The EU's Charter of Fundamental Human Rights will become an
integral part of the EU constitution, and the EU will finally be allowed to accede
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. Until now, accession has been prohibited due to the
EU's lack of competence to legislate in the area of human rights. Nationals of
member states shall also acquire citizenship of the European Union, a status that
will entitle them to rights provided under the constitution. EU citizenship will be
in addition to national citizenship. Lastly, the new constitution will create an
area of "freedom, security and justice" to govern asylum issues, border control,
immigration, judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, police
cooperation and the creation of a European public prosecutor's office.
Subsidiarity and Proportionality Doctrines Clarified
In an effort to better balance the play between national and EU competence,
the draft constitution opens with a statement that the EU shall respect the
national identities of its member states. It flags as fundamental principles the
doctrines of subsidiarity,17 proportionality,18 and loyal cooperation. 19' 2 While

is Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra note 9, art

2. (both

versions the same: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty,

democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.").
16 Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, art. 5; Adopted Constitution
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 8.
17 "The doctrine of subsidiarity... holds that action should not
be taken at a higher level unless it
helps: unless individuals get more of what they want," available at http://www.jeanmonnet
program.org/papers/97/97-01-4.html.
18 The proportionality doctrine "holds that 'measures adopted
by public authorities should not
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain legitimate objectives in the
public interest; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse should be
made to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused (to the individual) should not be
disproportionate to the aims pursued."' Antitrust Remedies in the U.S. and E.U.: Advancing a
Standard of Proportionality, E. Thomas Sullivan, quoting Nicholas Emiliou, The Principal of
Proportionalityin EuropeanLaw 2 (1996).
"9 "The principle of loyal cooperation requires
that the Member States support the actions and
policies of the Union actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, to
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Union," Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, available at
http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=7996.
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these doctrines are not new to EU law, they are relatively untested by the
member states or the ECJ. The constitution includes a draft protocol on the
application of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, as well as one on
the role of national parliaments in the EU. 21 The effect of this protocol should be
to (1) better define and reinforce ways that the EU institutions should apply
subsidiarity in their daily functions, (2) provide a vehicle for the national
parliaments' political control of subsidiarity activity in the EU and (3) increase
the frequency of referrals to the ECJ on the failure of EU institutions to respect
and apply subsidiarity as a method to curb EU involvement where member state
activity is more appropriate.
Delineation of Competences
As a related issue, the draft constitution catalogues the competences of the EU
and the member states.22 Some of these competences are not new and others are
determined by the application of the subsidiarity doctrine. However, a definitive
catalogue of exclusive and shared competence will be helpful in future
legislation. It is important to note that the doctrine of conferred powers is still a
fundamental principle.23 As under the current European Community and EU
treaties, the EU may act only within the limits of the competence conferred on it
by the constitution to attain the objectives of the constitution. And, as before,
competences not conferred on the EU remain with the member states. For
example, the draft constitution assigns the EU exclusive competence in the areas
of free movement (of persons, goods, services, and capital), competition, internal
market issues, customs union, common commercial policy, monetary policy
(e.g., the euro) and common fisheries policy. 24 Additionally, the EU would have

exclusive competence over international agreements with third-party countries
where its conclusion is mandated by an EU legislative act, where it is necessary
for the EU to exercise an internal competence or where the international
agreement affects an internal EU act. 25 Areas of shared competence include
internal market issues; freedom; security and justice; agriculture and fisheries;
transport; trans-European networks; energy; social policy; economic and social
cohesion; the environment; public health; consumer protection; cooperation and
20Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra note 9.
21 Draft

Protocols on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality and

the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, Presented at the European Convention,
Brussels, Feb. 27, 2003, CONV 579/03, Annexes I & III (2003), available at http://www.jeanmon
netprogram.org/conference/convention.html [hereinafter Draft Protocols]; Adopted Constitution
Treaty, Protocols Annexed (the protocols as adopted in July 2003 include information for
implementation as well as goals of interparliamentary cooperation and subsidiarity and
proportionality application success).
22Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, art. 1-16, art. 10-12; Adopted Constitution Treaty,
supra note
9, art. 11-13.
23 Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, art. 8; Adopted Constitution Treaty, supranote 9, art. 9.

24Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, art. 11; Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra note 9, art. 12.
25

Draft Protocols, supra note 21, art. 13; Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra note 9, art. 12.
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humanitarian aid; and research and technological development.26
Foreign Policy
Many of the proposals above are simply clarifications or codifications of
current EU practice. The real controversy injected by the draft constitution is in
the area of foreign policy. While all seem agreed that the EU needs to have a
greater international presence, there are considerable, if not debilitating,
differences of opinion as to how this can best be achieved.27 The draft
constitution will likely serve as a springboard for further debate.28
The draft constitution creates a Foreign Secretary for Europe who answers to
the member states' governments. 29 This position is like the current office of the
EU High Representative, but seems to have more power.3 ° The EU is charged
with defending Europe's interests and independence by advancing its values in
the broader world. The Common Foreign and Security Policy demands that the
member states "actively and unreservedly" support the Union's common foreign
and security policy in a "spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity."'" In addition to
these broad proclamations, the Convention has established working Aroups in
many areas, including the specific areas of external policy and defense.
The Working Group on External Policy focuses on the importance of
collective action to exercise increased influence over international
developments.33 It calls on the constitution to define the EU's objectives and
general principles in external affairs and to give the EU competence to conclude
agreements externally on those issues that run parallel to its internal

26Draft Protocols, supra note 21, art. 12; Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra
note 9, art. 13

(adopted with only slight changes from the draft).
27See Deutsche

Welle,

The Labor Pains of an EU Constitution, May

18, 2003, at

http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1430-A_869577_1A,00.html.
28 See generally id.
29 See Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, art. 41 (this draft describes
plans to incorporate a "High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy"); Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra
note 9, art. 27 (Union Minister of Foreign Affairs is detailed in the Adopted version as being
answerable not to Member-State governments, but to the European Council and Council of
Ministers).
30See Deutsche Welle, The Labor Painsof an EU Constitution, supra note 27.
3

Preliminary Draft, supra note 9, art. 14; Adopted Constitution Treaty, supra note 9, art. 15 (a

separate sub-point has been incorporated into the adopted version that concentrates on progressive
action toward a common defense policy).
3 See Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action,
Presented at the European
Convention, Brussels, Dec. 16, 2002, CONV 459/02, WG VII 17 (2002), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00459en2.pdf [hereinafter External Action Report];
and Final Report of Working Group VIII - Defense, Presented at the European Convention,
Brussels, Dec. 16, 2002, CONV 461/02, WG VIII 22 (2002), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00461 en2.pdf [hereinafter Defense Report].
33See External Action Report, supra note 32, Part A.
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competences. This Working Group strives for increased efficiency by advocating
qualified majority voting on foreign policy issues; however, it would allow
constructive abstention by a member state that did not support the EU action.
The Working Group on Defense targets three highly controversial areas: crisis
management, responses to terrorist threats, and armaments.34 Under crisis
management, the EU would expand the context of the Petersburg Tasks, which
govern crisis management in situations involving the use of military resources.
Such expansion could include conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations,
and military advice and assistance. Additionally, this Working Group could
improve efficiency when access to financing is required to carry out joint
operations that do not affect political control. Like the Working Group on
External Policy, the Working Group on Defense supports the practice of member
state constructive abstention as a way to allow supporting member states to
foster even closer ties of cooperation. Concerning terrorist threats, the working
group advocates a new solidarity clause that would allow any member state to
employ full EU resources to protect its citizens and institutions. All this should
enable willing member states to achieve closer defense cooperation. Lastly, in
the area of armaments, the Working Group on Defense supports research on
defense technology, including the development of military space systems.
In those areas gunning for increased European cooperation in foreign policy,
member states are allowed to exercise constructive abstention or opt-out
provisions. Essentially, no active cooperation is required of a member state.
While abstention and opt-out provisions can be politically expedient, and can
even increase decision-making efficiency, they also could weaken the perception
of European-wide action in foreign policy. One could argue that constructive
abstention or exercise of an opt-out provision would violate a member state's
duty of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The success of the EU's foreign policy
might hinge on this issue. Some member states might not agree to participate in a
true common foreign security policy without the ability to promote and protect
national interests. However, it is unlikely that third-party countries will take
seriously any position by the EU that does not reflect the positions of its member
states.36
Conclusion
Because the draft constitution is still in nascent form, it is appropriate to ask
what effect it can and should have on the European Union. As the debate
34 See generally Defense Report, supra note
32.
35 See Summary of the meeting held on 15 October 2002 for Working Group
VII on External
Action, Presented at the European Convention, Brussels, Oct. 21, 2002, CONV 356/02, WG VII 8
(2002), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cvOO/00356en2.pdf.
36 Statements by European Commission President Romano Prodi, Growing and Thriving
in a
10-12 (2003), available at
Knowledge Society, SPEECH/03/70, Feb. 12, 2003,
http://www.europa.eu.int [hereinafter Prodi].
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illustrates, the effect of the constitution will depend largely on whether the goal
of the constitution is to establish a federal Europe, to simply create a vehicle for
legitimacy, or to form something in between those two ends of the spectrum.
If one desires a federal-style Europe, the draft constitution will have to create
a Europe that is more than an organized trading market.37 Europe will need to
speak with one voice on global issues and have one defined set of politics that
allows it to defend itself on a global stage.3 8 This goal, while somewhat
attractive on paper, is unrealistic at this point in the EU's evolution, as illustrated
by Europe's disjointed response to the United States and Iraqi war. 9 While some
member states openly supported the United States' actions, others blatantly
opposed it.40 The EU was largely non-committal and regretted its inability to
have a common position on Iraq.4
For a less ambitious goal, the draft constitution could strive to make
improvements to the EU's existing structure. European integration clearly has
not advanced to the point where Europeans want to be one super-state, so
perhaps Europe does not require a traditional constitution.42 Rather, it may be
more important to have a constitution that curbs the growth of the EU's power,
especially in areas where the EU's authority affects member states and their
citizens. 3 Primarily, this middle ground on the spectrum would require EU
institutions to be more transparent, efficient and democratically accountable. 4
45
At a minimum, and at the opposite end of the spectrum,
one could desire only
that the new EU constitution have a symbolic effect. Under this analysis, total
European integration is both undesirable and unachievable.4 6 Even if the new
constitution fails to check the EU's assertion of power over its member states
and citizens, an EU constitution could still be significant symbolically. 47 For

37 See generally Prodi, supra note
36.
38

Id.

39

Id.

40 Id.
41

Id.
See Schmid-Liibbert & Schaefer, supra note 8.
43 See id.
44 The Scottish Parliament, Minutes of Proceedings from the Meeting of the Parliament on June
12, 2003, vol. 1 no. 10 session 2 (2003), available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/plenary/
mop-03/mop-06-12.htm (expression that Scotland believes that "the EU should seek to become
more effective, efficient, democratic, transparent, accountable, and easier to understand" in
amendment S2M- 124.4 to motion S2M- 124, supporting the EU as a confederation).
45 Teameurope.Info, The Convention on the Future of Europe, July 11, 2002,
at
http://www.teameurope.info/guide/convention.htm (notes the constitution as a symbolic objective).
46 See Schmid-Lbbbert & Schaefer, supra note 8.
42

47See generally Teameurope.Info, The EU State Constitution: a FurtherErosion of Democracy,
Dec. 17, 2001, at http://www.teameurope.info/board/statement-constitution.htm
(notes the
constitution as a symbol and basis for further EU federalism).
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example, symbolism has helped in the areas of human rights and foreign policy.
Recent human rights clauses in the treaties and the Charter of Fundamental
Human Rights are largely unenforceable against member states, but they have
established criteria that applicant member states must adopt before joining the
EU. In the foreign policy arena, Europe can be perceived as one body, even
where differences surface. For example, France, Germany and Belgium defied
NATO on the Iraqi war where their bond was defined by treaty, yet they stuck
together as Europeans.48
In conclusion, the Union's exercise of drafting a constitution is healthy. No
matter what legal effect the document has, or where on the spectrum it falls, it
will positively affect the EU. At a maximum, it will more closely integrate the
EU, making it more like a true federation.4 9 Or it could provide the foundation
for constitutional and institutional improvements that would increase efficiency
and democracy in the EU, especially at this critical juncture of enlargement. 50 At
a minimum, the constitution could provide yet another symbolic gesture on the
part of the member states, which could later evolve into more permanent legal
acts.51 In a matter of months, Europe will choose its future.

48 Times Online,

European Allies Unite Against US-Led War,

5, Feb.

10, 2003, at

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,1-572838,00.html.
49 See Teameurope.Info, The EU State Constitution: a Further Erosion of Democracy, supra

note 47.
so See Schmid-Liibbert & Schaefer, supra note 8.
51 See Teameurope.info, The EU State Constitution: a Further Erosion of Democracy, supra

note 47.
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